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1.1  Introduction 
Cynicism about the federal bureaucracy is widespread. The general public 
views federal employees as aloof, uncaring bureaucrats who are unresponsive 
to their requests. Throughout the country, there is a prevailing sense that gov- 
ernment is synonymous with inefficiency and waste and that the federal bu- 
reaucracy is essentially out of control. Discussions in both the academic and 
the popular press have focused on the issue of poor productivity and ways to 
make the bureaucracy more effective and responsive to voters in the provision 
of  services.  ’  dIndeed, restructuring the federal bureaucracy so that it “works 
better and costs less” is a major objective of  the Clinton administration.2 In 
addition to concerns about worker productivity, presidents have also expressed 
serious misgivings about their ability to manage and direct the bureaucracy 
in the implementation of  p01icy.~  President Nixon, for example, felt that the 
bureaucracy was  subverting his programs, and President Reagan repeatedly 
charged that big government was the problem, not the solution. 
Despite all this attention and concern, antibureaucratic sentiments are long 
standing, and few would claim that substantial progress has been made in ad- 
dressing the problems of bureaucracy. From time to time, there have been at- 
tempts to reform the federal civil service through the installation of new per- 
sonnel rules that would reward performance and allow for a greater degree of 
political control over the actions of federal employees. These efforts began in 
1905 with President Theodore Roosevelt’s appointment of the Keep Commit- 
tee to investigate ways of organizing the federal government more effectively; 
they were followed by  President Taft’s  1912 Commission on Economy and 
Efficiency, President Franklin Roosevelt’s Brownlow Committee in 1936, Pres- 
ident Truman’s Hoover Commission of 1949, a second Hoover Commission in 
1953 under President Eisenhower, President Carter’s Reorganization Project of 
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1977, President Reagan’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control in 1982, and, 
most recently, President Clinton’s National Performance re vie^.^ 
In each of these cases, recommendations have been made to provide incen- 
tives for productivity, to develop procedures for greater control of the bureau- 
cracy, and to eliminate redundant programs and bloated  staff^.^ These efforts, 
however, have met with entrenched opposition, both from federal employee 
unions,  which stress that civil service rules  are in place to guard against a 
return to the evils of patronage, and from elected officials, who have been wary 
of implementing major changes in the federal personnel system.h 
Besides performance, the other major problem of bureaucracy is a lack of 
accountability. Much of the current discussion of accountability has centered 
on the latitude available to administrative agencies for engaging in opportunis- 
tic behavior of their own in the implementation of congressional statutes and 
administration policies. Within the literature on this subject, there is debate as 
to how far agency officials can go in policy making to channel programs and 
services to favored constituents, to expand agency mandates and budgets, or to 
act on their personal preferences in ways that deviate from the desires of Con- 
gress and the president. Some authors view the federal bureaucracy as acting 
in self-interested ways to promote agency growth and budget maximization.’ 
Other authors emphasize strategic alliances made among the bureaucracy and 
congressional committees that weaken presidential control of executive agen- 
cies and allow for opportunism (see Sayre 1965, 1-3;  Kaufman 1965,57-68). 
This problem has often been traced to the rise of professionalism in the civil 
service and the formation of  close ties between agency officials and profes- 
sional interest groups. 
A parallel literature has developed regarding the ways in which Congress 
and the president attempt to constrain the discretionary actions of administra- 
tive officials, although congressional and presidential interests can, and often 
do, diverge. One avenue is through congressional committee oversight of spe- 
cific agencies (see Weingast and Moran  1983; Gilligan and Krehbiel  1989). 
Another is through the budget appropriations process (see Fenno 1966; Wil- 
davsky 1979; and Weingast and Moran  1983). A third is through systems of 
administrative rules for policy making, such as those outlined in the Adminis- 
trative Procedures Act (60 Stat. 237  [and subsequent amendments]; see also 
Arnold  1979; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast  1987; and Wilson  1989). In- 
deed, some argue that the intricate system of committee oversight, appropria- 
tions hearings, and administrative procedures provides a relatively short rein 
that does not allow federal bureaucrats to stray very far from the wishes of 
Congress (see, e.g., McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Nevertheless, it is 
fair to say that much  skepticism remains as to how much these institutions 
really constrain the bureaucracy. 
In this book, we examine the persisting problem of bureaucracy. Our objec- 
tive is to identify the forces that have molded the existing civil service system. 
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a permanent bureaucracy and a vast array of bureaucratic rules were created 
as the result of conscious decisions by successive politicians. The system was 
put into place incrementally through executive orders and statutes, following 
political negotiations among the president, members of Congress, and interest 
groups, particularly federal employees. Understanding  why  the federal civil 
service system has evolved in the way it has, with its well-known problems of 
productivity and accountability, requires attention to the objectives of elected 
officials and the confused political property rights that exist over the federal 
bureaucracy. 
As we point out, the U.S. Constitution did not provide either the president 
or the Congress with clear authority over the federal bureaucracy. Hence, they 
have competed as rivals to direct the bureaucracy in different ways. In part, the 
civil service system has been designed to reduce the costs of competition over 
control of the bureaucracy. This rivalry, however, has also allowed federal em- 
ployees to figure as a powerful additional interest in molding the civil service 
system. The book concludes that, given the forces underlying the civil service 
system, major institutional changes, such as adoption of  the full list of pro- 
grams suggested by the National Performance Review in 1993, is unlikely. 
It is ironic that the current civil service system is, itself, a product of an 
earlier reform movement, one that was aimed at correcting conditions that are 
reminiscent of today’s problems-a  federal labor force that was inefficient, 
wasteful, and, seemingly, out of control. In the beginning, the federal civil 
service system was based on patronage, and reforms were sought by the presi- 
dent and the Congress to improve productivity in the provision of government 
services. Lafer, rules and sanctions were added to limit the president’s and the 
Congress’s access to the bureaucracy in order to shield bureaucrats from politi- 
cal manipulation  and threats.  These protections,  however, reduced  political 
control of the bureaucracy and facilitated the rise of  federal employees as a 
third party, with a specific agenda for further structuring the civil service sys- 
tem. Despite the complaints of politicians about the functioning of the bureau- 
cracy, much (but certainly not all) of the current arrangement is as they have 
wanted it and, indeed, as they have designed it. Recognizing this point helps 
make clear why meaningful change will be difficult to achieve.8 
The shift from a patronage system to one of bureaucratic civil service rules 
was, in aggregate, a major institutional change, one that has important implica- 
tions for the control and effectiveness of the government labor force. We argue 
that an analysis of the political economy of the origins and development of the 
civil service system is essential for understanding the rationale for the current 
arrangement and how it affects presidential and congressional authority over 
the bureaucracy and the performance of federal employees. Moreover, analysis 
of the gradual formation of the modern civil service system provides  a case 
study of the mechanisms by which institutions are created and altered in the 
political arena. In general, these institutions can have profound implications 
for long-term economic gr~wth.~  Analyzing the historical development of the 4  Chapter 1 
civil service will help in understanding how the system, with all its apparent 
faults, came to be. Importantly, the analysis provides an explanation for why 
elected officials, who often run  campaigns directed against the bureaucracy, 
do not support major reforms.'O 
1.2  Political Institutional Change 
Until the early part of the twentieth century, most federal employees were 
hired on the basis of patronage. Patronage workers were expected to be politi- 
cally active on behalf of  their mentors by  engaging in campaign work and 
other partisan activities and by contributing part of their salaries in the form of 
political assessments. Under patronage, federal workers did not have job ten- 
ure, and they were removed routinely after elections, whenever their political 
benefactors were defeated (see, e.g., Fish 1905; Fowler 1943). Patronage was 
a popular political institution that generated votes for federal politicians. It was 
viewed as a means of  democratizing the government service. Thousands of 
individuals applied for positions in the federal government after every election, 
and the president allotted patronage appointments among members of  Con- 
gress as a means of building support for administration policies. Once secured 
through such exchanges, patronage positions were awarded by  members of 
Congress or local political machines to the party faithful as rewards for their 
partisan services. Under patronage, there was accountability. Loyalty and re- 
sponsiveness to political mentors were the essential attributes of the contracts 
between patronage workers and politicians. 
The shift from patronage to the current system began with the Pendleton Act 
of 1883 (22  Stat. 403), which authorized merit hiring for a small portion of the 
federal labor force. This shift was in response to the problems of administering 
a growing patronage labor force that had become increasingly corrupt and inef- 
fective. Gradually, the system was extended and modified over the next hun- 
dred years, and ultimately it displaced patronage as the principal means of 
hiring and firing most federal civilian employees. By  the  1980s, there were 
only about 5,000 political appointees in the federal service, less than 1 percent 
of  total civilian employment (see Pfiffner 1987). The growth of the civil ser- 
vice system through presidential executive orders and congressional statutes, 
however, involved more than expanded coverage. It also involved the adoption 
of  new rules and sanctions regarding work practices, compensation policies, 
promotion conditions, job tenure, and political activity by  federal employees. 
As such, the civil service system that emerged over time provided the gover- 
nance and incentive structure for the vast federal bureaucracy that exists today. 
It is our contention that the key to understanding the current bureaucratic 
problems of performance and accountability is the relative political autonomy 
of the civil service system and the unusual protection that it provides federal 
employees. Federal civilian white-collar employees are hired on the basis of 
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involved in politics. Once beyond a probationary period, federal employees are 
granted tenure, and it is extremely costly to dismiss them (see Johnson and 
Libecap 1989a, 1989b). They are promoted within the framework of civil ser- 
vice rules that heavily weigh seniority over merit, and they are paid under a 
national pay plan that compensates them more than their private-sector coun- 
terparts are (see Smith 1977). There is also considerable wage compression 
within the federal salary structure, making it difficult to create a “rank-order 
tournament” for federal employees in promotion to encourage labor productiv- 
ity (see Lazear and Rosen  1981). Further, their  salaries are protected  from 
fluctuating political conditions that lead to the growth or decline of their agen- 
cies (see Johnson  and Libecap  1989a). Given this structure of  bureaucratic 
rules, it is not surprising that there are debates over productivity, shirking, and 
the extent of discretionary behavior by federal employees. 
In  adopting merit hiring in the place of  patronage,  the president  and the 
Congress were responding to the immediate demands of voters. But the very 
process  of  institutional  change established the prerequisites for subsequent 
modifications in the civil service system. That is, one phase of institutional 
change created an environment that either required or facilitated further insti- 
tutional adjustment. Hence, the process of institutional change in the civil ser- 
vice was one of incremental alteration, in a manner similar to that described in 
a general context by Douglass North (1990, 89).11 
According to North, external events and the actions taken by various actors 
alter the relative costs and benefits of particular institutions and set in motion 
the forces of change. But institutional change is most often incremental be- 
cause those interest groups negatively affected resist and because to change the 
“rules of the game” fully requires changing the culture, customs, and beliefs of 
members of  the society.  ’* Information  is costly, and, hence, current beliefs 
about an institution are based on limited information that, factually, may  be 
right or wrong. North conjectures that changing these beliefs is costly and that 
this condition slows down the process of institutional change.13 
Given this approach to institutional change, four forces can be identified as 
underlying the sequential modification of the civil service system. (1) Changes 
in the political and economic environment facing the president and members 
of Congress have affected their relative support for patronage. (2)  Once estab- 
lished, adjustments in the new civil service system, taken at one point in time, 
affected the relative positions of the president and the Congress regarding ac- 
cess to and control of the bureaucracy. Because the president and the Congress 
competed for authority over federal employees, both sought further modifica- 
tion in civil service rules to maintain or to advance their own positions. (3) The 
actions taken by the president and the Congress often assisted the efforts of 
federal unions, as a critical third party, in obtaining subsequent additions to the 
civil service system. The inauguration of the merit system raised the relative 
returns for federal employees of organizing to lobby for additional bureaucratic 
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engaged in lobbying and other political activities that contributed in an im- 
portant way to the gradual development of the civil service system. (4) Instru- 
mental in promoting  the cause of  federal workers has been  the widespread 
belief that patronage is evil and that federal workers should therefore be spared 
from political influence. This conviction remains a powerful factor to this day, 
and it presents an obstacle to meaningful reform, which is often presented by 
opponents as weakening civil service protections and reexposing government 
employees to patronage pressures.’“ The contribution of  the federal bureau- 
cracy as an influential interest group in creating and protecting the civil service 
system is almost totally neglected in the literature; it therefore receives special 
attention in this volume. 
In pursuing the topic of institutional change in the federal bureaucracy, we 
employ a number of paradigms. We will, for example, borrow heavily from the 
public choice 1iterat~re.l~  In that literature, politicians are accorded the same 
behavioral  status as any other individual in society; that is, they seek to max- 
imize their own self-interest, most often by  seeking election and reelection. 
Furthermore, well-organized interest groups are recognized as having an ad- 
vantage in a representative  democracy. These groups focus on narrow issues 
and tie their votes, money, and support of politicians to those issues. The inter- 
action between politicians and interest groups in the design of the civil service 
system is a central focus of our analysis. In examining the opportunities for 
major change in the civil service system, we consider the division of power in 
the federal government and borrow from a recent literature on “structured in- 
duced equilibrium” that focuses on the rules for government decision making 
(see Shepsle  1979; Shepsle and Weingast  1984; and Weingast and Marshall 
1988). The drafters of the Constitution designed a structure that assured that 
policy would not be overly responsive to the preferences of any one branch of 
government. This federal structure, however, strictly limits the ability of  the 
president or the Congress to make unilateral changes in the civil service system 
at any point in time. Third, we rely heavily on the basic property rights para- 
digm and its implications for the costs borne by  politicans in competing for 
control of the bureaucracy. Finally, we turn to the industrial organization litera- 
ture to derive hypotheses about the management of the federal labor force and 
to explain the outcomes of different organizational arrangements. 
At the outset, we want to emphasize that this book is not intended to be 
another expos6 of the performance of federal bureaucrats. Nor do we offer a 
plan for reforming the existing federal bureaucracy. Indeed, as we discuss in 
chapter  8, there is a sense in which, despite all the complaints, the current 
institutional arrangement may in fact be relatively “efficient,” given the struc- 
tural  constraints  of  the  federal  system and  the  costs  of  major  institutional 
change. 
At this stage, we also wish to emphasize some additional points regarding 
the federal bureaucracy  in order to better  understand the  debates about the 
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civil service system over the past hundred years. Distinctions must be made 
among political appointees, who hold the top positions in most agencies; se- 
nior career officials, who hold positions in the Senior Executive Service (SES) 
or have top management  General  Schedule positions  (GM- and  GS-14 and 
-15) within the civil service; and the rank-and-file career workforce, who hold 
positions from GS-1 through GS-13. These three groups have very different 
incentives for policy  administration  and operate  under  different  constraints 
within the bureaucracy. Senior political appointees are designated by the presi- 
dent, with the approval of  the Senate. They are expected  to help set and to 
carry out the administration’s policy agenda within the bureaucracy. As such, 
their goals are political-to  advance the objectives and interests of the presi- 
dent. Their positions within the bureaucracy are temporary, lasting at most the 
length of a presidential administration. They lack tenure protection and can be 
removed at the president’s discretion. Senior career officials, who hold leader- 
ship positions within agencies, may have a role in the formulation of  agency 
policy; they can also affect policy administration through long-standing ties to 
congressional committees, contacts with professional groups and other constit- 
uents, and management directives to subordinates. Unlike political appointees, 
they owe no specific allegiance to the administration. Rank-and-file career em- 
ployees generally do not establish policy, but they are charged with administer- 
ing it. They perform the routine operations within agencies, have day-to-day 
contact with constituents, and are often in a position to determine the details 
of  policy  application. They have strict tenure guarantees, have no expressed 
ties to the administration or to Congress, and by law are to be politically neu- 
tral. In fact, under the current bureaucratic  structure, both  groups of career 
civil servants have, to varying degrees, been placed essentially outside direct 
presidential or congressional control. 
The implications  of  a well-protected,  career bureaucracy  for the  perfor- 
mance and accountability of government have not been emphasized in the re- 
cent literature, which often views the bureaucracy as a single unitary entity.Ih 
The tendency is to focus on senior officials and their ability to carry out, or 
their propensity to stray from, the wishes of the president or the Congress. We 
point out that rank-and-file employees, who are the most shielded from politi- 
cal control by the civil service system, can also contribute to “policy drift.” Not 
only does the bureaucracy matter, but the motives and restrictions provided by 
the civil service system also vary across the three groups involved. Hence, any 
analysis of the bureaucracy requires an understanding of the institutional envi- 
ronment, its ramifications, and how it came to be. 
In chapters 2 and 3, we describe how the federal civil service system was 
inaugurated  and expanded by  the president and the Congress in response to 
increasing problems of administering a growing patronage labor force. In this 
discussion, we borrow from the theory of the firm, which addresses the prob- 
lems of organizational size and the loss of control in explaining the movement 
away from patronage (see Williamson 1967; Williamson 1975, 117-26).  In par- 8  Chapter 1 
ticular, as the patronage labor force grew after the Civil War, it became more 
and more costly for federal politicians to monitor the actions of their patronage 
appointees in order to ensure that the demands of constituents were met. The 
partitioning of the federal civilian labor force into patronage and merit compo- 
nents allowed the president and the Congress to address those demands while 
still maintaining patronage where it remained politically valuable. Our analysis 
suggests that, with the most at stake in improving the overall efficiency of 
government, the president would be the leader in the adoption and expansion 
of the merit system. 
These changes in the administration of the federal labor force in response to 
growing organization  size, however, created new problems that required fur- 
ther institutional adaptation. In order to constrain political opportunism regard- 
ing the use of merit employees, limited job-tenure guarantees and requirements 
for political neutrality were added by  the president and the Congress to the 
initial civil service rules. A major hypothesis  offered in this volume is that 
these rule changes, followed by the gradual replacement of patronage workers 
with merit system employees, set the stage for the rise of a new and influential 
interest group. 
In chapters 4-6,  we point out that these institutional modifications served to 
promote the rise of federal workers as an organized, independent interest group 
with very particular  objectives in structuring the bureaucracy. The goals of 
federal unions, as a special interest, were often not consistent with the objec- 
tives of  federal politicians,  particularly the president. Conflicts over various 
aspects of the civil service system ensued, but federal unions were able to use 
the ongoing rivalry between the president and the Congress over control of the 
bureaucracy  to  secure favorable  legislation  and  executive  orders for their 
members. 
In structuring the bureaucracy, the president and the Congress had an incen- 
tive to insulate senior-level officials from political manipulation in the admin- 
istration of policy. Achieving this goal required shielding them from arbitrary 
dismissals and limiting the role of  political favoritism in promotion and ad- 
vancement. Federal unions, on the other hand, were concerned about obtaining 
similar protections and benefits for their membership, which was drawn largely 
from the rank and file. Because lower-level employees were more removed 
from policy determination and thereby less likely objects of manipulation, pro- 
viding them with the same protections and benefits granted to senior career 
officials was less in the interest of  the president or the Congress. Indeed, as 
these provisions were added to the civil service system, it became increasingly 
difficult for federal politicians to motivate or to manage the bureaucracy. As 
tenure provisions were strengthened and bureaucratic rules extended, the abil- 
ity of politicians to dismiss employees was reduced, weakening their control 
over the bureaucracy. In chapter 6, we offer a number of reasons for the relative 
success of federal workers in obtaining higher compensation and job protec- 
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In chapter 7, we examine a number of implications of  a highly protected 
bureaucratic labor force for the performance of government. We  suggest that 
civil service protections for career federal employees both allow and reduce 
the motivation for opportunistic bureaucratic behavior. On the one hand, since 
salaries and promotion opportunities for rank-and-file employees are insulated 
from the effects of agency growth or decline, those employees have less incen- 
tive to push for the expansion of  agency mandates and budgets in order to 
advance. These findings bear directly on the frequently stated hypothesis that 
bureaucrats have a strong incentive to promote the growth of  their agency in 
order to increase their ~a1aries.I~  On the other hand, under the civil service 
system, the president and the Congress have fewer means of disciplining and 
controlling the rank-and-file labor force. For particular agencies, mandates can 
be  restricted,  budgets  cut,  discretion  curtailed;  but,  absent  fundamental 
changes in civil service rules, job tenure remains, restrictions on supervisory 
authority continue, and salaries and promotion proceed along previously estab- 
lished timetables. 
The major finding of the volume is that the president and the Congress are 
unlikely to make sweeping changes in the civil service system. Both, of course, 
would like to enhance their own control over the bureaucracy. But placing se- 
nior career officials more or less off  limits to political  manipulation  in  the 
administration of policy provides significant benefits to federal politicians be- 
cause it lessens the temptation to act opportunistically. The net benefits to fed- 
eral politicians of these protections as they apply to lower-level career employ- 
ees, however, seem to be negative. There are fewer gains from shielding these 
individuals from political competition and manipulation because they play a 
more peripheral role in policy formation and execution. In contrast to the rules 
governing senior-level personnel, the civil service rules that protect these indi- 
viduals are due largely to the actions of federal unions. But the President and 
members of the Congress are rationally reluctant to take on this powerful inter- 
est group. 
Finally, the book argues that a full account of  why we should not expect a 
sweeping change in the civil service system requires an understanding of how 
the history of federal patronage has been perceived. Patronage in any form has 
come to be viewed as undesirable. As we discuss in the final chapter, current 
civil service reformers, academic experts, and, recently, the Supreme Court are 
convinced that all career government workers must be protected from political 
pressure. The often-repeated claim is that any adjustment in civil service rules 
to address issues of accountability and productivity potentially could lead to 
the unraveling of the system of protections that have been put into place and to 
a return to the spoils system. Although we believe that this concern is exagger- 
ated, because the president and the Congress have had a vital interest in lim- 
iting patronage through the adoption and maintenance of the merit system, the 
specter of the spoils remains as a powerful break on reform efforts, one that 
federal unions and their supporters have been able to exploit. 10  Chapter 1 
Since 1883, piecemeal adjustments in the civil service system have been 
made in response to the objectives of the president and the Congress, as they 
competed for control of the bureaucracy, and in response to the demands of 
federal employee unions. Through this process, attributes have been incorpo- 
rated into the civil service rules that have had long-term consequences for the 
governance and performance of  the federal bureaucracy. As this book makes 
clear, the bureaucratic structure put into place at the behest of these three par- 
ties has created the “problem of bureaucracy,” and changes in this system will 
occur at best incrementally. 
Notes 
1. See, e.g., Sayre (1965), Heclo (1977), Mosher (1979, 1982), Kaufman (1981), 
Seidman and Gilmour (1986), Knott and Miller (1987), Wilson (1989), and Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992). These discussions cover nearly thirty years, and it is striking how 
little the problems have changed. More recent discussions include U.S. House of Repre- 
sentatives (1993) and DiIulio, Garvey, and Kettl (1993). The report of the U.S. House 
of  Representatives’ Committee on  Government Operations  states,  “In  general,  we 
found that public perceptions-those  that waste and abuse are rampant throughout the 
Federal Government-to  be generally accurate. It pervades every agency and hundreds 
of important programs (1993, v-vii).  The committee had  examined nineteen depart- 
ments and agencies. Similarly, DiIulio, Garvey, and Kettl(l993,62-65)  claim that fed- 
eral programs and bureaucrats have a reputation for cumbersome or unresponsive ad- 
ministration, excessive complexity, and rudeness. In this book, we do not attempt a 
broad comparison of the performance of the federal government relative to corpora- 
tions, private nonprofit organizations, or state and local governments. Our concern is 
with how the institutional structure of the civil service system came to be and its impli- 
cations for the performance and accountability of the federal bureaucracy. We examine 
aspects of the efficiency of the civil service system in cahp. 8. 
2. The Clinton administration’s  plan for reforming the federal bureaucracy, submit- 
ted to the president by Vice President A1  Gore, hopes to remove “useless bureaucracy 
and waste” and free workers “from red tape and senseless rules’’ (see Gore 1993). 
3. The volume edited by  Sayre (1965) offers a number of articles pointing to the 
political autonomy of  the federal bureaucracy  and the associated reduced ability of 
politicians to make the bureaucracy  accountable (in particular, see Kaufman  1965). 
Kaufman (198 1) examines the independence of bureau heads and their ties with profes- 
sional groups. Another examination of this theme as well as a detailed discussion of 
the protection provided by  bureaucratic rules is provided in Heclo (1977). Mor6 re- 
cently, Mosher (1982), Knott and Miller (1987), Rosen (1989), and DiIulio, Garvey, 
and Kettl (1  993) outline some reforms that would improve bureaucratic accountability. 
4. For a discussion of the Keep Committee and the Commission on Economy and 
Efficiency, see Van  Riper (1958, 191-92,  219-22)  and U.S. House of Representatives 
(1912d). The Hoover Commission’s report is provided in Hoover Commission (1949). 
The President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (Grace Commission 1984, 343) 
and DiIulio, Garvey, and Kettl (1993, 8) summarize past efforts to reorganize the fed- 
eral government. Gore (1993) outlines the Clinton administration’s  recommendations. 11  The “Problem of Bureaucracy” 
5. The pressures on almost every president to create these reform commissions 
arose out of broad concerns about the effectiveness and costs of  government institu- 
tions, rather than solely as a result of complaints by specific constituents that an agency 
was not providing the desired services. As an indication of just how broad the scope of 
these investigations has been, the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control 
submitted thirty-six major task force reports and eleven studies of specific items, which 
the commission argued would bring a three-year savings of $424.4 billion (Grace Com- 
mission  1984). Similarly, after examining every cabinet department and ten  federal 
agencies, the National Performance Review recommended reforms that would bring a 
five-year savings of $108 billion (Gore 1993, iii). 
6. The lack of  progress has been recognized. The Hoover Commission (1949, v) 
points to the “scant success” of previous reorganization efforts. 
7. See Niskanen (1971), Tullock (1965), and Downs (1967). For discussion of the 
Niskanen budget-maximization hypothesis, twenty years after it was first proposed, see 
Blais and Dion (1991). For empirical examination of an aspect of the Niskanen hypoth- 
esis, see Johnson and Libecap (1989a). 
8. That politicians have been instrumental in the design of the bureaucratic system 
has been noted by Horn (1988), Moe (1991), and Knott and Miller (1987). 
9. For a summary of  a broader literature on institutional change and the role of 
institutions  in  economic  and  political  decision  making,  see  Furubotn  and  Richter 
(1991). Specific work includes that by  Davis and North (1971), Williamson (1975, 
1985), North  (1981,  1990), Eggertsson  (1990), Ostrom  (1986,  1990), and Libecap 
(1989a). 
10. James Wilson has noted, “No politician ever lost votes by denouncing the bureau- 
cracy” (1989,235). Yet little is actually ever done to bring major reforms to the system. 
11. One institution’s legacies to subsequent institutional change often create a sense 
of path dependence. For discussion, see North (1990) and David (1985). 
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are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”  (1990, 3). They 
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Weingast  and  Moran  (1983),  McCubbins,  Noll,  and  Weingast  (1987,  1989), Moe 
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